In the spring of 2014 
national citizenship" (Anderson, Gibney, and Paoletti 2013: 2) . Kanstroom (2007: 5) takes this idea further when he argues that "deportation is now, and has always been, considerably more than [an instrument of immigration policy]" and that it is also a "powerful tool of discretionary social control." Governments use deportation statistics to show they are tough on crime and thereby gain legitimacy through this version of social control (Gibney 2008; Bosworth 2011) . In addition, Tamara Nopper (2008: 204-5) points to the racial dimensions of this process when she argues that that the increase in criminal deportations "reflects the growing intersection between immigration enforcement and the forms of crime control to which Black populations in the United States (both immigrant and native born) have been historically subjected." Nopper's point is important: the tough-on-crime approach has historically been used primarily on racial minorities, and deportation is no exception. Deportability subordinates migrants not by actually deporting all those that are deportable but by deporting some such that others may remain in a state of enhanced vulnerability.
The illegality and deportability of undocumented migrants render them and their labor power "an eminently disposable commodity" (de Genova 2005: 215) .
These studies all provide useful ways to understand deportation. However, I would like to offer a few general critiques. Most of these studies do not explain the racialized and gendered nature of deportation, thus failing to address the question of why nearly all deportees are men of color. Moreover, they tend to look at deportation as a domestic policy issue even though deportation involves a relationship between at least two countries. Because of this international aspect, it makes sense to consider deportation in the context of theories of migration that view international migration as part of the global movement of labor and capital. As I will argue below, deportation is best understood when we take into account the latest crisis of global capitalism.
Looking at deportation from this perspective helps us to perceive how global economic restructuring has played out in gendered and racialized ways.
Mass Incarceration and Mass Deportation
There are a number of parallels between mass incarceration and mass deportation. For instance, the vast majority of targets of both forms of state repression are Black and Latino men (Christian and Thomas 2009; Western 2006; Alexander 2012; Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013) .
Both mass incarceration and mass deportation have been justified using a racialized and gendered politics of fear. In addition, they both emerged in times of crisis: mass incarceration came in the aftermath of the 1970s oil crisis and the consequent deindustrialization, and mass deportation escalated and intensified in the aftermath of the 2007 Great Recession. Finally, there are sectors of the transnational corporate elite that have found ways to profit from each of these phenomena.
In this section, I will make these connections clear.
Demographics of Incarceration and Deportation
According to the Pew Hispanic Center, of the 10.4 million undocumented adults in the United States in 2008, 4.1 million were women. And, 80 percent were from Latin America or the Caribbean (Passel and Cohn 2009) . Any non-citizen can face deportation, but undocumented immigrants are most at risk for deportation. Although 40 percent of undocumented immigrants are women, they make up only 10 percent of deportees. And, although 20 percent of undocumented immigrants are not Latin Americans, these immigrants account for less than 2 percent of deportees.
Latin American and Caribbean men are much more likely to be deported than any other group.
The expansion of immigration law enforcement has focused almost exclusively on immigrant men, yet scholarly studies of deportation rarely mention gender (Coutin 2010 , Gibney 2008 Hernandez 2008 , Brotherton and Barrios 2011 , Kanstroom 2012 King, Massoglia, and Uggen 2012; Kretsedemas 2012; Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez. 2008) . In 2011, 89 percent of all removals involved men. Moreover, the rise in removals since 1998 has almost exclusively affected male non-citizens while the number of females deported has remained stable. The tremendous rise in deportations has also affected some national origin groups more than others. Nearly all of the increase in removals since 2003 is due to an increase in the number of Mexicans and Central Americans removed. These disparities refer to overall removals, which can include undocumented immigrants as well as those who are legally present. Whereas any undocumented immigrant can face removal, legally present immigrants only face deportation after a criminal charge or a visa violation (such as working more than the allotted hours on a student visa). When the numbers of Caribbean legal permanent residents deported are examined, distinct trends emerge. Dominicans and Jamaicans are the two groups most likely to be deported on drug charges. Overall, around a quarter of all criminal deportees are deported on drug charges, yet these percentages are far higher for Jamaicans and Dominicans-80 percent for Dominicans and 40 percent for Jamaicans (Siulc 2011; Headley et al 2005) . The Dominican Republic and Jamaica are the two countries with the highest rate of criminal deportees. Relatedly, they are also the legal permanent residents most likely to face deportation. Both Jamaicans and Dominicans are about five times as likely as other legal permanent residents to be deported (Golash-Boza 2015) . Deportations data show a marked increase in the deportations of male Mexicans and Central Americans as well as in male Jamaican and Dominican legal permanent residents since 1996. The rise in deportations has targeted Black and Latin American male immigrants as these populations have become superfluous in the downsized economy. Jamaicans and Dominicans have primarily been apprehended via the criminal justice system, thus their deportations are an extension of mass incarceration (Golash-Boza 2015) . Mexicans and Central Americans have also been caught up in the dragnet in this fashion, but many others have been apprehended due to changes in the way immigration laws are enforced. We can imagine ways that immigration laws could be enforced that would have targeted women: there could have been raids on hotels or informal markets, but this did not happen. 7 Instead, immigration law enforcement has teamed up 7 In January 2016, there was a widely publicized roundup of Central American women and children. In many ways, this was more spectacle than law enforcement. News accounts report 121 people were deported in this way. Although pernicious to these families, this is a relatively small number when we consider that over 1,000 people were deported every day between 2009 and 2014. with criminal law enforcement-a collaboration that has led to these specific gender and racial disparities in deportations. In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress implemented a series of drug and crime control policies that disproportionately affected African Americans (Tonry 2011) . Whereas Black-to-White prison admission rates were three-to-one from 1926 to 1975, they had risen to six-to-one by 1997 (Murakawa 2014 
The Politics of Fear
The above section demonstrates that mass incarceration and mass deportation are both forms of state repression that have disproportionately targeted Black and Latino men, which, I argue, is one of the conditions of possibility as this is a vulnerable and stigmatized group. This section explores the raced and gendered discourses that made this targeting possible. The implicit argument in both of these sections is that these extreme forms of state repression would not have happened without the dehumanization of the targets through racialized and gendered discourses.
One of the most famous examples of a politician using the fear of crime as a campaign tactic is known as the "Willie Horton" case. In the 1988 run for presidential office, the George H. W. Bush campaign was able to play on White Americans' fear of crime and racial prejudices against Blacks through the use of an ad that featured "Willie Horton." William Horton, a Black man, escaped from prison while on a weekend pass. He then "kidnapped and brutally assaulted a White couple in their home, raping the woman and stabbing the man" (Mendelberg 1997 ). An ad that featured this story and a mug shot of Mr. Horton was used by the Bush campaign to portray Democratic candidate Dukakis as lax on crime. This ad was part of Bush's successful presidential campaign. This is just one of many examples of politicians using the fear of crime for political gain. Notably, the Willie Horton case used both the fear of crime and the fear of Black men to push forward a political agenda.
As Katheryn Russell-Brown (1998) explains when she writes about the criminalblackman, fear of crime is both raced and gendered. Whereas Black women are stereotyped as angry, welfare queens, and jezebels, Black men are stereotyped as thugs, rapists, and hustlers (Collins 2004) . The gendered and raced stereotypes of Black men as criminals contribute to a racial and gendered ideology that justifies the mass incarceration of Black men. Popular discourse in the United States that represents Black men as criminally inclined serves as a justification for the mass incarceration of Black men, and leads people to believe that we build prisons to protect ourselves from this threat. Which discourses, then, justify mass deportation of Black and Latino men?
In the post-9/11 context, a construction of immigrant men as dangerous criminal aliens and terrorists has emerged. This construction of the dangerous immigrant is gendered male and racialized as a Latino criminal (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013) or an Arab terrorist (Naber 2006 ). In the post-9/11 context, people perceived to be Arabs have been victims of hate crimes and other forms of harassment due to the conflation of Arabs and terrorists. State policies have targeted Arabs. One example is the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which required male visitors from twenty-five Arab and Muslim countries and North Korea living in the United States to report to immigration officers and be fingerprinted, photographed, and questioned. Despite interviewing over eighty thousand people, no one was deported or denied entry on terrorism grounds, although many were deported for having overstayed their visas. Overall, relatively few Arabs have been deported from the United States since 9/11 (Golash-Boza 2012). Instead, state policies designed to combat terrorism have targeted Latinos.
The targeting of Latinos in immigration policy enforcement has been accompanied by media representations of Latinos as dangerous. As scholars such as Leo Chavez (2013) These representations have led to a sense of fear among White Americans towards Latino men (Eitle and Taylor 2008) , and politicians have played into these fears. In the run-up to the 2016 Presidential election, candidate Donald Trump told a crowd: "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. … They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems … They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists." 9 Statements like these reinforce the stereotype of Mexicans as "criminal aliens." The escalation of deportations has been carried out in the name of making the United States safer -both from "criminal aliens" and from terrorists. Notably, the stated mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), according to its website, is "to secure the nation from the many threats we face" and, a substantial portion of the DHS budget has been dedicated to deporting Latinos who pose no obvious threat to the nation. As Alberto Gonzales (2013: 6) notes, "criminalization in the discursive sense serves as the ideological glue of the homeland security state; it is a process in which a set of discourses attribute criminal characteristics to a targeted group, in this case, Latinos, to win consent for legal violence." The legal violence, in this case, is mass deportation.
These "controlling images" (Collins 2004 ) of Black, Latino, and Arab men as scary have served as the discursive fodder for the implementation of state repression. If people in the United States did not live in fear of terrorism and of crime, it would be more difficult for the state to justify massive spending on mass incarceration and mass deportation. It is remarkable that the state spends billions of dollars on deportation during a time of economic uncertainty. However, a look at the rise of mass incarceration in the aftermath of the oil crisis can help us to understand this apparent paradox.
Crises of Capitalism
An analysis of deportation as a tool of state repression in the context of a global economic crisis is aided by a look back at a similar analogy: the relationship between mass incarceration and the oil crisis. In the United States, the oil crisis and concomitant deindustrialization of urban areas were the precursors to the rise of mass incarceration as a tool of state repression. The global impacts of the oil crisis of the 1970s led to worldwide economic turmoil and widespread emigration. The 1970s crisis set into motion a series of global processes that led global elites to expand their sphere of influence through economic restructuring. This restructuring involved the incorporation of countries into the global economy, yet also led to mass displacement: millions of people began to leave their countries of birth in search of survival and opportunities elsewhere.
The migrants deported today are often the same migrants (or their children) who were forced out of their home countries in the aftermath the 1970s oil crisis.
The oil crisis, deindustrialization, and globalization. After World War II, the U.S. economy grew rapidly with the production of automobiles and steel. These manufacturing jobs often paid well and came with benefits. Mostly men worked in these jobs, and many earned a family wage-an income sufficient to support their wives and children (Milkman 1997; Sugrue 2014 ). However, the post-World War II period did not last long. In the 1970s, capitalism began to enter one of its cyclical crises of overproduction (Robinson 2012) . In the United States, the economy evolved from one with a strong manufacturing base and a solid working class to one with an hourglass economy featuring a preponderance of service sector jobs, tremendous inequality, and a decline in unionized jobs (Lee 2005) . In 1954, 35% of the nation's workforce was unionized.
By the early 1980s, this had dropped to 20%. And, by 2008, the unionization rate was 8% (Thompson 2010) .
The crisis of capitalism in the early 1970s had two primary causes: 1) the rise of global competition in the manufacturing sector; and 2) the skyrocketing of oil prices in 1973. In Detroit, for example, competition from German and Japanese automakers combined with the increase in oil prices led manufacturers to redesign their products, outsource production, and automate parts of the production process. Outsourcing and automation led to a decrease in the number of manufacturing jobs in the United States. Between 1979 and 1985, the United States lost 10 percent of its manufacturing jobs. These losses were concentrated in certain geographical areas, thereby amplifying their localized effects. The Midwest lost over a million jobs and the Northeast lost 800,000. By contrast, the West gained 53,000 manufacturing jobs (Sassen 1989) . Detroit was one of the cities hit hardest by global economic restructuring: it lost 70 percent of its manufacturing jobs between 1969 and 1989 (Farley, Danziger and Hozer 2000) .
The decision of transnational corporations to move their labor-intensive manufacturing jobs to developing countries transformed the local economies in those countries in gendered ways.
Instead of providing jobs to unemployed urban males, most of these manufacturing jobs in developing countries have gone to young women-many of whom had migrated from rural areas.
These new industrial zones often have high turnover rates due to difficult working conditions. Young women migrate from the countryside to work in these jobs yet often only last a few years.
Instead of returning to their countryside homes after quitting or being fired, many of these women have become international migrants. The prevalence of women from developing countries entering the global economy in this fashion has led to a feminization of international migration (Sassen 1998 ).
Since 1990, about half of all international migrants have been women (United Nations 2016) and migrants have entered the labor force in gendered ways. In the United States, deindustrialization and the concomitant outsourcing of manufacturing led to high-income gentrification, which generated a demand for high-end goods and services that can't be mass produced (Sassen 1998) . The rise of couples with both partners in high-end jobs created a new need for specialized and individualized services such as nannies and gardeners as well as specialty shops with pre-made delicacies. Many of the jobs in this sector created by high-income gentrification are highly segregated by gender and nativity-male immigrants labor outdoors in construction and gardening while women work indoors in childcare and housekeeping. The U.S. native-born men who had worked in manufacturing were often not in a position to retool themselves and take on the new service jobs. Instead, immigrants filled many of these low-paying service jobs (Boehme 2011; Louie 2001; Massey et al 2002) . In 2010, immigrants made up 16 percent of the workforce, and they were over-represented in specific industries, namely construction, food services, agriculture, household employment, and hotels (Singer 2012) .
Race, gender, and deindustrialization. The loss in manufacturing jobs translated into increases in unemployment and poverty rates, and African Americans and men were affected the most. By the end of the 1980s, over a third of all African Americans in Detroit lived in poverty, as did half of Detroit's African American children (Kodras 1997) . When the economic crisis hit Detroit and other cities, White residents often fled, whereas African American residents rarely had this option. The consequence of this is that by the end of the 1980s, urban areas were much less White and much more impoverished than they had been a decade earlier. The unemployment rates of African American men in these urban areas rose to extraordinarily high rates-by 1990, only 37 percent of males 16 or over who lived in the Black Belt in Chicago were regularly employed (Wilson 1996) .
African American men were hit hard by deindustrialization in Detroit, largely because Black men were concentrated in the sectors that experienced the greatest decline. In 1940, more than half of all employed African American men worked at the Ford Motor Company, one of the few companies willing to hire Black men and pay them a decent wage. These well-paying jobs, however, began to move from the city of Detroit in the 1950s (Sugrue 2014 There are three primary reasons for the prevalence of Black unemployment in Detroit: 1) the skills mismatch; 2) the spatial mismatch; and 3) racial discrimination by employers. African American men in Detroit are less likely to have the skills and education needed for the types of jobs where there has been growth such as engineering, which leads to the skills mismatch. Much of the job growth in Detroit has been in the suburbs and African American families have been excluded from buying homes in these areas, which has created the spatial mismatch. Notably, in 1990, 50 percent of employed Blacks who lived in the city of Detroit commuted to the suburbs for work. Finally, studies have shown that discrimination persists. Black applicants find it more difficult to find work even when they are qualified. One study found that although Black men and women do apply for jobs in the suburbs of Detroit, they are less likely than White men and women to be hired (Farley, Danziger and Hozer 2000) .
It is worth pointing out that the "spatial mismatch" is not due to African Americans' refusal to move to White neighborhoods. Instead, as Thomas Sugrue (2014) Although men have been the primary targets of mass incarceration, the effects of mass incarceration have rippled out into communities in gendered ways. Children are the most obvious victims of the incarceration of their parents. Megan Comfort (2007: 274) reports that "an estimated 1.1 million jail and prison inmates in the United States are parents to 2.3 million children; 90 percent of these parents are fathers." 93% of inmates are men, and half of these inmates have children (Christian and Thomas 2009 ). Foster and Hagan (2009: 191) present strong evidence that the imprisonment of fathers has negative causal consequences for children." They further contend that economic disadvantages are only one of many that children of the incarcerated face: children also suffer educational and emotional disadvantages when their parents are incarcerated.
Women-both mothers and grandmothers-are left behind to pick up the pieces when a father is incarcerated.
We can perceive a similar pattern of gendered collateral consequences of mass deportation.
Nearly all deportees are men, and about a quarter of all deportees-or 100,000 a year-are the parents of U.S. citizen children (Rosenblum and McCabe 2014) Because of this, there are over 5,000 children in foster care because their parent has been deported or detained (Applied Research Center 2011) . Insofar as mostly men are deported, women are left to fend for themselves when their children's father is deported. In most cases, the deported men are no longer able to provide financially for their children after they have been deported. Scholars are just beginning to contend with the collateral consequences of deportation, yet it is clear that mass deportation has gendered and racialized consequences.
The Great Recession and mass deportation. Scholars of global capitalism argue that the current crisis is a new one-and that it was caused by the transnational capitalist class having reached its limits (Robinson 2014; Sassen 2014) . In recent years, it has become apparent that there is little room for global capital to expand: nearly all corners of the globe have been incorporated into global capitalism (Robinson 2012; Sassen 2014) . The 1970s crisis led to expansion due to global competition and deindustrialization, and the more recent crisis is a consequence of this expansion having reached new limits. In the early twenty-first century, with little room to create new markets, the "transnational capitalist class" turned to "fictitious capital-that is, money thrown into circulation without any base in commodities or in productive activity" (Robinson 2012: 183) . Investors and speculators began to make securities, pensions, and debts "tradeable,"
and therefore a potential source of profit. These financial activities led to a collapse of the U.S. interior removals. By 2008, there were 140,000 interior removals, and they reached a peak (188,000 annual removals) in 2011 (Rosenblum and McCabe 2014) . A removal is a deportation that involves a court process, while an interior removal is a deportation that involves a person who is arrested inside the United States and is not a recent border-crosser. Just as there was a shift towards more interior removals, there was also an increase in ICE apprehensions.
With the slowdown in employment during the Great Recession, fewer immigrants were attempting to enter the United States-and thus there were fewer border apprehensions. (Carson and Diaz 2015) . The private prison sector was able to grow as a business during the prison boom. As prison expansion leveled off in the late 20 th century, these companies set their sights on the immigration detention business, and this move has been extremely profitable for companies like CCA.
Whereas the United States will eventually free most of its U.S. citizen prisoners, it banishes non-citizen deportees typically for life. This keeps them from competing for scarce jobs or for public aid. However, deportees continue to exist in their countries of origin. Unable to stop this flow of deportees, countries have responded by finding ways in which deportees can serve another purpose. In many cases, deportees serve as convenient scapegoats for rising crime. Instead of blaming crime on years of repression, on tremendous inequality or on poverty (conditions often created by the global economic restructuring itself), it is easier for the government to blame crime on deportees-expendable, stigmatized subjects. This can be seen happening in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Central America (Brotherton and Barrios 2011; Headley et al 2005; Coutin 2010; Gonzalez 2013) .
In Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, media outlets and government officials blame the rising crime wave on deportees (Headley et al 2005; Brotherton and Barrios 2011) . In El Salvador and Honduras, a similar trend can be seen with the blame placed primarily on deportation for the proliferation of gangs. In these and other countries, deportees have become a convenient scapegoat for longstanding public safety problems (Coutin 2010; Gonzalez 2013 
Conclusion
An understanding of why mass deportation is happening now and why it targets Black and Latino men requires bringing two fields into conversation that often talk past one another: studies of the political economy of global capitalism and studies of mass incarceration in the United States.
Research on global capitalism helps us to understand the global nature of the current crisis and the repressive state response to it. Research on mass incarceration sheds light on how the economic crisis affects people in inner cities as well as how and why Black and Latino men are targeted.
When we look at the issues writ large, it becomes clear how they are all connected, and provides a more comprehensive explanation for why we are seeing unprecedented numbers of deportations.
An understanding of mass deportation requires a consideration of the political economy of racialized and gendered state repression.
This analysis of the political economy of racialized and gendered state repression renders it evident that studies of mass deportation and mass incarceration need to take into account global economic trends, corporate interests, and racialized and gendered discourses that attempt to justify this repression. The use of extreme force by the state is seldom exercised against the most powerful sectors of society. Politicians, the media, corporations, and government bureaucrats have found ways to manipulate state power and use it to further marginalize the marginalized. They are able to do this by relying on a gendered and raced politics of fear that resonates with popular stereotypes about Black criminals, Arab terrorists and Latino criminal aliens. Once these strategies are made clear, it is easier for scholars to challenge these depictions as well as the state policies on which they are based. I'd like to end this article, with two observations, one theoretical, and one empirical. First, a theoretical note: to arrive at the conclusions set forth in this article, this article has engaged at least three areas of inquiry: critical race theory, feminist theory, and world systems theory. This intersectional analysis moves us beyond a consideration of race, class, and gender as embodied identities and towards a systemic intersectional analysis. I hope that this piece pushes scholars in these three areas to collaborate and develop new ways to incorporate analyses of racism, capitalism, and patriarchy to develop more complex sociological understandings of society.
My final observation is empirical: at the time of this writing in the summer of 2016, both mass incarceration and mass deportation appear to be leveling off. Nevertheless, the state capacity for repression is not being contested in any substantial way. DHS continues to have a budget of $60 billion and oversees a broad complex of cages. One key difference between immigration detention and criminal incarceration is that detention was built up in large part based on privately owned capacity. DHS could draw down its capacity for 34,000 detainees a day to 15,000 simply by cancelling all contracts with private prisons and repealing the detention bed mandate. Of course, a daily average of 15,000 detainees would still be a historic high.
In contrast to detention, the state capacity for criminal incarceration is much more entrenched.
Despite this, there are still possibilities for a reduction in the number of prisoners. In California, state prisons have been as high as double their capacity. We could substantially reduce the prison population in California by eliminating prison overcrowding. Closing prisons is also not out of the question: in New York, Governor Andrew Cuomo has closed thirteen prisons, and plans to close more. 15 As these changes take place, it will be critical for scholars of race, gender, and political economy to pay attention and call for an end to these repressive state practices.
About the Author
Tanya Golash-Boza is 
